- Vincenzo Scrutinio (presenter)
- Titop Boeri (Bocconi University, IZA, LSE)
- Edoardo di Porto (CSEF, INPS, University of Naples Federico II, UCFS, Uppsala University)
- Paolo Naticchioni (INPS, IZA, University of Roma Tre)
Abstract
This paper provides the first analysis based on a randomized control trial for home visits checking on sickness leave in the public sector. The experiment was carried out in Italy, a country with large absenteeism rates in the public sector, and it concerned the universe of public employees. We exploit unique administrative data from the Italian social security administration (INPS) on sick leave and work histories, and we find that receiving a home visit reduces the number of days on sick leave in the following 16 months by about 7%. This overall effect is driven by individuals found irregularly on sickness leave, who reduce the number of certificates they send (especially those of shorter duration). These effects are stronger in the South and in Centre of Italy and for workers who are older than 50 years of age. We interpret our findings as a deterrence effect of home visits: workers being found irregular on sick leave experience a decline of about 2.2% of their wage in the following 16 months.
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