Abstract
We study the causal link between dishonesty and selection into public employment. Our empirical strategy exploits a natural experiment (the Argentine draft lottery) that provides exogenous variation in the incentives to engage in dishonest behavior in a real-world context with high-stake consequences. When military conscription was mandatory, eligibility was determined by both a lottery and a medical examination. In order to avoid conscription, individuals at risk of being drafted had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation in the incentives for draft evasion, we first present evidence of cheating in medical exemptions. We then show that individuals with higher probability of having cheated in their health checks as young adults also show higher propensity to occupy coveted non-meritocratic public service jobs later in life. This evidence suggests that not only cheating can be induced, but it can also affect future behavior.
Invited by: Paolo Vanin
Local Organizer: Stefania Bortolotti