Abstract
“Must-haves”—items that distributors need to “compete effectively”—have played a central role in many recent antitrust cases. We first show how downstream multi-product competition and one-stop shopping give rise to such items: not carrying them impairs distributors’ ability to compete for other items in their lineups. We then explain why must-have items make vertical mergers and horizontal mergers of upstream suppliers more anticompetitive, while downstream consolidation helps to mitigate must-haves’ anticompetitive effects. Our model provides the first formal theory of must-haves and supports the view that cases involving these products should face greater antitrust scrutiny.
Book a slot (online)
Please contact the Local Organizer Alessandro Tavoni if you are interested, as there will be a limited number of 15 minutes slots online (from 11am to 12pm and following the seminar).