Internal Seminar: Giulio Zanella

Title: "Unconventional active labor market policy: Insights from new policy experiments"

  • Date: 18 January 2023 from 13:00 to 14:00

  • Event location: Seminar Room - Piazza Scaravilli, 2 + Microsoft Teams Meeting

Abstract

Two policies that provide financial incentives for reemployment of job seekers at risk of long-term unemployment are evaluated in experiments involving about 10,000 job seekers in Italy: (i) a reemployment voucher that incentivizes a specialized provider; (ii) a reemployment bonus that incentivizes the job seeker directly. The voucher is effective for men while the bonus works for women, in line with gender heterogeneity in search behavior. Each policy is no less effective than conventional job-search assistance. No side effects on post-treatment earnings or job duration are detected. A dual voucher--bonus system based on self-selection would be cost effective.