Abstract
Competing lines of research start and grow as information is gradually uncovered by researchers who, driven by career incentives, sort themselves into fields. Using a strategic experimentation framework in which agents irreversibly specialize in one of two risky fields, we describe the equilibrium forces that determine the size, shape, and length of such "research waves." We show that when information updates (which are more frequent as more researchers specialise in a field) arrive as breakdown, or `bad news,' in equilibrium all researchers specialise in one field, generating a unique, and potentially slow, `badwagon' wave. When information updates arrive as breakthroughs, or `good news,' both fields can be explored in equilibrium in two fast surges, if the efficacy of the information-production technology is high enough. We also evaluate the impact of evaluation criteria of researchers, such as citations' counts, on the types of research waves that can arise in equilibrium.
Local Organizer: Nicola Mastrorocco