Eventi
Research seminar - Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies Without Rational Expectations - Luigi Iovino (Bocconi)
Aula Seminari - Piazza Scaravilli 2
PhD in Economics thesis defences - 31st cycle
Seminar Room (Piazza Scaravilli 2)
Internal seminar - The long Road to modern Economic Growth: Space, Trade, and Agglomeration - Alexander Lehner
Aula Seminari - Piazza Scaravilli 2
Research seminar - Incarceration Spillovers in Criminal and Family Networks - Katrine Løken (NSE - Bergen)
Aula Seminari - Piazza Scaravilli 2
I Grandi Temi della Politica Economica - L'euro a 20 anni: come vorremmo riformarlo?
Sala Farnese di Palazzo d’Accursio - Piazza Maggiore 6 - Bologna
Internal seminar - Psychological and Social Motivations in Microfinance Contracts: Theory and Evidence - Junaid Arshad
Aula Seminari - Piazza Scaravilli 2
Research seminar - Mothers’ labour supply, household income and child outcomes in sole-parent families - Marianne Bruins (Oxford)
Aula Seminari - Piazza Scaravilli 2
2nd year PhD Forum
Seminar Room (Piazza Scaravilli 2)
Research Seminar: Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy - Luigi Pascali (UPF)
Seminar Room, Piazza Scaravilli 2
Internal seminar: “Assessing financial constraints at the firm level: the critical role of the demand for credit” - Patrick Sevestre
Seminar Room, Piazza Scaravilli 2
Research Seminar: "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential games" - Sigrid Suetens (Tilburg U.)
Seminar Room, Piazza Scaravilli 2
Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings. The findings are generally in line with the notion that strategic uncertainty is a key determinant of behavior in repeated games.
I Grandi Temi della Politica Economica - Brexit: Ne valeva la pena?
Oratorio di San Filippo Neri - via Manzoni 5 - Bologna