Abstract
I investigate the hypothesis surrounding the "strategy of tension" in Italy during the 1970s. The prevailing thesis suggests that rogue elements within the state orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks and acts of political violence to counter the growing support for the Italian Communist Party (PCI)—the strongest communist party in the Western world—and to pave the way for an authoritarian shift with the backing of far-right organizations. Using a game-theoretic model and an empirical analysis based on a novel dataset of terrorist attacks and political violence—including detailed information on location, timing, and the political affiliation of both perpetrators and victims—I demonstrate a positive association between terrorism, victimization, and PCI support. To reinforce these findings, I exploit local exogenous shocks to PCI support driven by the international turmoil of 1968–69, which mobilized the working class and university students against the central government, leading to a sharper increase in PCI consensus in provinces where they were more concentrated. Finally, I provide empirical evidence suggesting that mafia-related violence against left-wing activists in Southern Italy served a similar purpose—and had similar effects—as far-right terrorism in the North.