Internal Seminar: Andrea Mattozzi

Title: "The Politics of Attention"

  • Data: 15 gennaio 2025 dalle 13:00 alle 14:00

  • Luogo: Seminar Room - Piazza Scaravilli, 2 + Microsoft Teams Meeting

Abstract

We study a model in which political parties can manipulate the importance of specific issues. Voters have ideal positions in a multidimensional policy space and give different weights to different issues. Two office and policy motivated political parties compete choosing policy positions but also manipulating the weights on each issue. This competition severely alters political interactions. First, it typically increases polarization of voters and policy positions. Under symmetric conditions, each party selects a distinct dimension to align closer with voters and emphasize in electoral campaigns, while maintaining divergent positions on all other dimensions. The model also predicts a newcomer advantage and significant effects from targeted advertising capabilities.