Agenda

Incontro

2nd year PhD Forum

In inglese In presenza

Incontro

2nd year PhD Forum

In presenza

Incontro

Research Seminar: Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy - Luigi Pascali (UPF)

In presenza

Incontro

Research Seminar: Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy - Luigi Pascali (UPF)

In inglese In presenza

Incontro

Internal seminar: “Assessing financial constraints at the firm level: the critical role of the demand for credit” - Patrick Sevestre

In inglese In presenza

Incontro

Internal seminar: “Assessing financial constraints at the firm level: the critical role of the demand for credit” - Patrick Sevestre

In presenza

Incontro

Research Seminar: "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential games" - Sigrid Suetens (Tilburg U.)

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings. The findings are generally in line with the notion that strategic uncertainty is a key determinant of behavior in repeated games.

In inglese In presenza

Incontro

Research Seminar: "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential games" - Sigrid Suetens (Tilburg U.)

Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that the second mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage points after learning, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings. The findings are generally in line with the notion that strategic uncertainty is a key determinant of behavior in repeated games.

In presenza

Incontro

I Grandi Temi della Politica Economica - Brexit: Ne valeva la pena?

In presenza

Incontro

Internal seminar - Testing the Internal Validity of Compulsory School Reforms as Instrument for Years of Schooling - Margherita Fort

In inglese In presenza

Incontro

Seminario interno - Testing the Internal Validity of Compulsory School Reforms as Instrument for Years of Schooling - Margherita Fort

In presenza

Incontro

I Grandi Temi della Politica Economica - Nuovi protezionismi: minaccia al commercio o all'ordine internazionale?

In presenza