Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between electoral support for Forza Italia, the party led by Silvio Berlusconi, and the intensity of asset confiscation from the mafia during Italy's second republic (from 1994 onward). Building on a probabilistic voting model that posits a reciprocal influence between the anti-mafia policies chosen by political parties and the mafia's electoral preferences, we explore the hypothesis that a colluding party can repay its "electoral debt" to the mafia only if it wins elections, by reducing the intensity of anti-mafia policies when in power. We test our theoretical predictions by examining the relationship between votes for Forza Italia and asset forfeiture across Sicilian municipalities over the last 30 years. Our findings reveal a significant decrease in the fraction of assets confiscated by judicial authorities returned to civil society by governmental agencies in areas with higher electoral support for Forza Italia during Berlusconi’s governments.