Abstract
It has been argued that public engagement in democracies has declined in the last decades due to a growing disconnect between citizens and their representatives. The European Union is a case in point, if not the most prominent example of an institution seen as suffering from a “democratic deficit”. Even the directly elected members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are often accused of being disconnected from the interests of European citizens. However, little is actually known about whether European legislators respond to their voters’ interests when making critical policy choices. We address this question by studying the determinants of MEPs’ votes on the approval of EU trade agreements. Against widespread Eurosceptic arguments, we find that these votes reflect the trade policy interests of MEPs’ constituencies. The results are robust to controlling for a rich set of variables and fixed effects to account for potential confounding factors, and using different sets of votes and econometric methodologies. An instrumental variable approach supports a causal interpretation of our findings.
Local organizer: Niko Jaakkola