Abstract
Serfdom has been portrayed in the literature as a system of unfree labor where nobles and the state colluded to exploit the peasantry. On this view, the coercive powers of the state, especially state enforcement of mobility restrictions, are what made the system so oppressive. But this is not consistent with evidence from serf societies indicating rulers were incapable of enforcing such restrictions in the localities. It will be argued here that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, serfdom existed where states were weak, and that serfdom waned as rulers grew stronger and centralized states emerged. The talk presents an informal theoretical framework for thinking about the role of the state in serf societies from the medieval period to the nineteenth century. Prussia and Russia are presented as comparative case studies with different outcomes, where the role of property rights and centrally controlled mechanisms of enforcement (such as appellate courts) had significant implications for state formation and, consequently, for long-term economic and political development. Drawing on evidence from medieval England to early modern central Europe, it is suggested that "inclusive institutions" in Europe had their origins in rulers' self-interest, as they leveraged institutional advantages (especially access to princely and imperial courts) in a competition with rivals for rents.
Local Organizers: Jonathan Chapman and Elena Korchmina