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SUMMARY:Research Seminar: "Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential games
 " - Sigrid Suetens (Tilburg U.)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Rome;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190219T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Rome;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190219T151500
DTSTAMP;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20260421T204401Z
UID:136c7e2bfaa64a9abc9812459fe29af2@dse.unibo.it
CREATED;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190215T125000Z
DESCRIPTION:Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's di
 lemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be
  supported in equilibrium as compared to simultaneous decision-making. The
  nature of the interaction is different\, however\, given that the second 
 mover in a sequential-move game does not face strategic uncertainty in the
  stage game. We study in an experiment whether sequentiality has an effect
  on cooperation rates. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooper
 ate\, sequentiality increases cooperation rates by around 40 percentage po
 ints after learning\, whereas with very low or high incentives to cooperat
 e\, cooperation rates are respectively very low or high in both settings. 
 The findings are generally in line with the notion that strategic uncertai
 nty is a key determinant of behavior in repeated games.
LAST-MODIFIED;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20190215T133710Z
URL:https://dse.unibo.it/en/events/research-seminar-empirical-evidence-on-
 repeated-sequential-games-sigrid-suetens-tilburg-u.
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE-TIME:20181028T020000
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